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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1932 the United States Supreme Court held that the states must
provide free legal counsel to indigent defendants in capital cases.' Since
then the Court has continued to define the scope of an indigent death
row defendant's right to counsel at various critical stages of the defend-
1. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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ant's trial and appeal.2 Following a direct appeal to the state court of
appeals and state supreme court, an inmate on death row may seek a
writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.3 A prisoner is
not entitled to state appointed counsel for that action.4
Next, the defendant may seek postconviction relief in state court or
in federal court if state remedies have been exhausted. Until recently,
however, the question remained whether the Constitution provides in-
digent death row inmates with state appointed counsel and financial
assistance in postconviction proceedings that collaterally attack the va-
lidity of a conviction, such as habeas corpus actions brought in state
and federal court.5
Under constitutional law and statutory provisions, capital defend-
ants are entitled to pursue certain postconviction remedies; neverthe-
less, an indigent death row inmate traditionally has not been entitled to
a state appointed lawyer for these proceedings.6 In Giarratano v. Mur-
2. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (holding that the right to counsel does not
extend to discretionary appeals to the state court of last resort or to the United States Supreme
Court); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (extending the sixth amendment right to counsel
to a misdemeanor defendant who ultimately receives a prison sentence); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that a defendant is entitled to state appointed counsel on the first appeal
of right from conviction); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that an indigent
felony defendant has a sixth amendment right to appointed counsel at trial); see also Berger, The
Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9,
14-16 (1986); Mounts & Wilson, Systems for Providing Indigent Defense: An Introduction, 14
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 193, 195-97 (1986).
3. For an excellent overview of the mechanics of a review of a capital sentence, see Wright &
Miller, In Your Court: State Judicial Federalism in Capital Cases, 18 URB. LAW. 659 (1986). A
federal court almost certainly will review every capital sentence at least once. Id. at 668; see also
Powell, Capital Punishment, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1035, 1039-41 (1989).
4. Ross, 417 U.S. at 600 (limiting the scope of the right to counsel to the first appeal of
right).
5. See 1 J. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 7.2, at 74 (1988).
See generally Mello, Is There a Federal Constitutional Right to Counsel in Capital Post-Convic-
tion Proceedings?, 79 J. CRuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1065 (1989); Millemann, Capital Post-Conviction
Petitioners' Right to Counsel: Integrating Access to Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles,
48 MD. L. REV. 455 (1989).
This Recent Development does not attempt to analyze the many intricacies of the habeas
corpus process. Many commentators have written on the complexity of the writ of habeas corpus.
For an in-depth discussion of this area, see, e.g., R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS (2d ed. 1969);
L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES (1981 & Supp. 1988); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REV. 441 (1963); Chemerinsky, Thinking
About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 749 (1987); Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73
MINN. L. REV. 247 (1989); Meador, The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Proce-
dures, 52 VA. L. REV. 286 (1966); Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1985);
Note, Successive Chances for Life: Kuhlmann v. Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus, and the Capital
Petitioner, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455 (1989).
6. Mikva & Godbold, You Don't Have to Be a Bleeding Heart, HUM. RTs., Winter 1987, at
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ray the Supreme Court held that an individual appointment of an at-
torney to represent an indigent death row defendant throughout the
process is not constitutionally required to fulfill the right of meaningful
access to the courts. Prior to Giarratano several district courts and cir-
cuit courts of appeals had disagreed over the scope of the right of access
and the necessity for attorney assistance or appointment.'
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that prisoners
have a constitutional right of access to the courts.9 The scope of that
right provides one rationale for determining whether indigent defend-
ants on death row are entitled to state appointed counsel for the pur-
pose of pursuing postconviction remedies.' 0 This issue is especially
relevant to inmates on death row because of the severity and finality of
the sentence." Any constitutional defects that may have tainted the in-
itial trial or sentence and that were missed on appeal can be remedied
only through habeas actions. A determination of the scope of the right
of access is especially important today due to the continuously ex-
panding death row population, the increasing frequency of executions
in the United States, and the growing shortage of competent and exper-
ienced attorneys to represent capital defendants at the postconviction
stage.'"
7. 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (plurality decision), rev'g 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc),
aff'g 836 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 668 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1986).
8. See, e.g., DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1988); Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F.
Supp. 259 (E.D. Mich. 1988); Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 511; Peterkin v. Jeffes, 661 F. Supp. 895
(E.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 855 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1988); Hooks v. Wainwright,
536 F. Supp. 1330 (M.D. Fla. 1982), .rev'd, 775 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
913 (1986); Gibson v. Jackson, 443 F. Supp. 239 (M.D. Ga. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 578
F.2d 1045 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1119 (1979); Corey v. Garrison, 403 F. Supp. 395
(W.D.N.C. 1975).
An important distinction exists between attorney assistance and a right to counsel. An institu-
tional attorney system provides attorney assistance to inmates who want to file postconviction
pleadings. The right to counsel provides an individual appointment and representation throughout
the postconviction proceeding.
9. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
10. See Note, A Prisoner's Constitutional Right to Attorney Assistance, 83 COLUM. L. REv.
1279 (1983).
11. For an excellent discussion and analysis of the errors that can go undetected in the capi-
tal punishment process and the likelihood of executing an innocent person, see Bedau & Radelet,
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987) (estimating that
350 innocent men have been sentenced to death in the twentieth century, 23 of whom have actu-
ally been executed).
12. See AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERiCA THE DEATH PENALTY app. 1, at 192-93
(1987); Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM.
U.L. REv. 513 (1988); see also Reid, Caught on Death Row, STUDENT LAW., Jan. 1988, at 15.
Thirty-six states now have capital punishment statutes: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Da-
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Commentators disagree about whether a constitutional right to
state appointed counsel in postconviction proceedings exists. Some
commentators believe that counsel must be provided to death row in-
mates for habeas petitions because inmates are not capable of bringing
effective postconviction actions without assistance in these overly com-
plex proceedings.'" Other commentators have noted that past Supreme
Court decisions make any constitutional right to counsel for collateral
attacks on convictions unlikely, notwithstanding the complexity of such
actions. 4 Many commentators have addressed the general area of post-
conviction counsel rights,'15 but the issue of whether this right is consti-
tutionally mandated remained unsettled until the Supreme Court
decided Giarratano.
This Recent Development focuses on whether the Court's decision
in Giarratano is consistent with prior decisions concerning the right of
meaningful access and the effect of the decision on the imposition of
the death penalty. Part II examines the Supreme Court's development
of a prisoner's right of access and the application of that right in vari-
ous cases involving the postconviction claims of capital defendants.
Part III examines recent cases that have defined further the scope of
the right of access, focusing on Giarratano. Part IV compares the
Court's holding in Giarratano with its previous holdings in right of ac-
cess cases. Part V concludes that appointed counsel for capital defend-
ants in postconviction proceedings is not constitutionally mandated,
but the lack of such counsel is illustrative of the inherently flawed capi-
tal punishment system in use today.
kota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE &
EDuc. FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.SA. (July 1989 & Execution Update Jan. 18, 1990) [hereinafter
DEATH Row, U.S.A.]. Only 13 states have executed prisoners since the reinstatement of the death
penalty in 1976: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Since 1976, 121 executions have oc-
curred in the United States. As of July 1989 there were 2210 inmates on death row in the United
States. Id.
13. See 1 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5, at 84 (stating that together the eighth and fourteenth
amendments require counsel at each step of a capital case from trial through federal habeas corpus
proceedings); Mello, supra note 12, at 531; Millemann, supra note 5, at 517 (concluding that
"[c]apital post-conviction petitioners should have an automatic right to counsel in state post-con-
viction proceedings").
14. See 2 J. CooK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AcCUSED § 7.10, at 293 (2d ed. 1986).
15. See generally Mello, supra note 5; Mello, supra note 12; Millemann, supra note 5; Miller,
The Right to Counsel in Collateral Proceedings-Habeas Corpus, 15 How. L.J. 200 (1969); Devel-
opments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1038 (1970); Note, supra note 10;
Note, Discretionary Appointment of Counsel at Post-Conviction Proceedings: An Unconstitu-
tional Barrier to Effective Post-Conviction Relief, 8 GA. L. REv. 434 (1974); Note, Criminal Proce-
dure-Post-Conviction Right to Counsel, 77 W. VA. L. REv. 571 (1975); Comment, The Right to




A. The Right of Meaningful Access: Bounds v. Smith"6
Some courts and commentators have stated that a prisoner's most
important right is meaningful access to the courts.1" None of the pris-
oner's other constitutional rights has any real meaning without the pro-
tection of access to court. A prisoner's right of access generally is
defined according to the guidelines established by the United States
Supreme Court in Bounds v. Smith.' The Bounds standard of mean-
ingful access has been the main principle applied by courts to deter-
mine whether an indigent death row defendant must be afforded state
appointed counsel in postconviction actions. 9
The issue before the Court in Bounds was whether the State of
North Carolina must protect a prisoner's right of access by providing
law libraries or alternative sources of legal aid.2 0 The State contended
that it had no constitutional obligation to provide inmates with legal
research facilities.2 1 The inmates, however, claimed that the State must
provide prisoners with access to law books or a reasonable alternative.22
The Court began its analysis by noting that an inmate's constitu-
tional right of access to the courts is well established.2 The right of
access requires that a state take remedial measures to correct any defi-
ciencies in its system so that an inmate's right of access to the courts is
"adequate, effective, and meaningful." '24
16. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
17. See DeMallory, 855 F.2d at 446; Hadix, 694 F. Supp. at 286; see also Hinckley, Bounds
and Beyond: A Need to Re-evaluate the Right of Prisoner Access to the Courts, 22 U. RICH. L.
REV. 19, 19 (1987).
18. 430 U.S. at 817. See generally Note, supra note 10, at 1283-86.
19. See, e.g., Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1988); Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d
1118 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (plurality decision).
20. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817. The inmates who brought the action in Bounds were incar-
cerated at various correctional facilities within the North Carolina prison system. Id. at 818. They
were primarily "writ writers" who wanted legal research facilities. Flores, Bounds and Reality:
Lawbooks Alone Do Not a Lawyer Make, 77 LAw LiBF J. 274, 281 (1984-1985).
21. See Flores, supra note 20, at 282.
22. Id.
23. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821. The Court relied on its decisions in Younger v. Gilmore, 404
U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam), and Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941), to support the right of access.
In Gilmore the Court affirmed a lower court decision mandating the establishment of law libraries
or, alternatively, the provision of professional or quasi-professional legal assistance for inmates.
See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 829. In Hull the Court struck down a regulation that prohibited prisoners
from filing habeas corpus petitions unless the petitions were drawn and approved by a state parole
board investigator. Hull, 312 U.S. at 549.
24. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822. The Court cited several examples of remedial measures that are
required to ensure meaningful access. Id. at 822-23. Indigent inmates must be allowed to file ap-
peals and habeas corpus petitions without the payment of docket fees. See Smith v. Bennett, 365
U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959). The state must provide trial records and
transcripts to indigent defendants at no charge so that the inmate can have "adequate and effec-
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The Bounds Court specifically held that the constitutional right of
meaningful access to the courts requires that assistance must be pro-
vided to inmates preparing "meaningful legal papers. 25 This assistance
could be provided by allowing inmates access to adequate law libraries
or, alternatively, assistance from persons trained in the law.2"
The specific constitutional basis for the right of access never was
explained fully in the Court's holding and presents a significant prob-
lem in the analysis of how far the right extends and precisely what it
includes.2 7 The difficulty of implementing a meaningful access plan is
clearly illustrated by the Bounds litigation itself. Ten years after the
Supreme Court's decision, the Fourth Circuit still was struggling with
North Carolina's access plan.2
Justice William Rehnquist's dissent in Bounds further magnified
the vagueness of the constitutional basis underlying the right to access.
Justice Rehnquist strongly asserted that no constitutional requirement
that an inmate have a right of access to the federal courts to collaterally
attack a sentence exists.29 Rather, when a prisoner seeks to collaterally
attack a final judgment of conviction, the Constitution requires only
physical access to the courts.30 Justice Rehnquist's chief concern was
that the holding in Bounds seemed to conflict directly with the Court's
ruling in Ross v. Moffitt3 1 A logical extension of Ross, according to Jus-
tice Rehnquist, would not provide a constitutional right to state ap-
pointed counsel in postconviction proceedings.2
tive appellate review." See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Counsel must be appointed to
indigent defendants for the first appeal of right from a conviction. See Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1968). Prisoners cannot be prevented from assisting each other with habeas corpus peti-
tions if no alternative form of legal assistance is available. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969).
25. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. At least one commentator has noted that by requiring a state to
expend funds to provide law libraries or legal services to prisoners, the Court may have expanded
the original right of access found in Hull and Avery. Instead of simply prohibiting a state from
impeding a prisoner's right of access through oppressive restrictions, the Court imposed an affirm-
ative state duty requiring the state to make previously unnecessary expenditures. See Potuto, The
Right of Prisoner Access: Does Bounds Have Bounds?, 53 IND. L.J. 207, 210 (1978).
26. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. By requiring a state to take these affirmative measures the
Court encouraged "local experimentation" and did not set forth what kind of assistance plan
would satisfy the Bounds standard. The Court also noted that although economic factors may be
considered when choosing an appropriate plan to ensure meaningful access, the cost of protecting a
constitutional right cannot serve as a basis for denying that right. Id. at 825.
27. See Hinckley, supra note 17, at 20; see also Potuto, supra note 25, at 216.
28. See Smith v. Bounds, 813 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1987).
29. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 837 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 840.
31. 417 US. 600 (1974) (holding that the right to counsel on the first appeal of right is not
extended to discretionary appeals to a state court of last resort or to the United States Supreme
Court).
32. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 840-41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist further stated
[Vol. 43:569
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Justice Rehnquist further concluded that if meaningful access to
the courts includes the provision of law libraries by the state, then no
reason prevents its extension to include a requirement that the state
provide appointed lawyers at the state's expense. Thus, no such right to
counsel would exist under Ross, but could be found through an exten-
sion of Bounds. A state might be wise to implement an attorney assis-
tance program for policy reasons, but according to Justice Rehnquist,
the Constitution does not require such action."3
The concern voiced by Justice Rehnquist has indeed reappeared
and comprised the question facing the Court in Giarratano: whether a
state is constitutionally required by the right of access to provide a sys-
tem of state appointed attorneys to assist a death row inmate making a
postconviction attack on a capital sentence.34
B. Application of the Meaningful Access Requirement
1. Hooks v. Wainwright
5
Following the Bounds decision, the lower courts had to determine
whether an individual state's plan provided prisoners with meaningful
access to the courts.3 An analysis of two such decisions shows the diffi-
culty courts have faced in interpreting the right of access, particularly
in capital punishment litigation. The court in Hooks v. Wainwright
closely analyzed the Supreme Court's alternative access plan. The
Hooks court considered a civil rights class action brought on behalf of
all indigent inmates incarcerated in Florida's prison system who alleged
that Florida provided inadequate access to the courts through its prison
programs. The primary issue was whether the assistance of attorneys,
in some form, was required to comply with the Bounds mandate of
meaningful access.38
that "none of our cases has ever suggested that a prisoner would have such a right." Id. at 841.
33. Id. at 841; see also Potuto, supra note 25, at 225 (discussing the difference between con-
stitutionally minimum standards and sound policy).
34. See infra notes 92-139 and accompanying text.
35. 536 F. Supp. 1330 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (Hooks I), rev'd, 775 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 913 (1986).
36. See, e.g., DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1988); Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d
1021 (3d Cir. 1988); Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2765
(1989) (plurality decision); Smith v. Bounds, 813 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1987); Caldwell v. Miller, 790
F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986); Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1986); Green v. Farrell, 801
F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1986); Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
37. The ultimate decision in this case was the result of over 11 years of litigation. Hooks I,
536 F. Supp. at 1331.
38. It is especially relevant to the focus of this Recent Development that this litigation impli-
cated the Florida prison system because Florida has an extremely large death row population and
a recognized shortage of attorneys to represent those inmates. See Mello, supra note 12, at 567-68.
Florida currently has the largest number of death row inmates with 295. Since 1976 Florida
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The district court extended the decision in Bounds and held that
to ensure meaningful access, any plan submitted by the State of Florida
had to provide some form of attorney assistance to inmates.-9 Libraries
alone would be insufficient to meet the constitutional requirements of
meaningful access.40 The Florida Department of Corrections had sub-
mitted a plan to comply with Bounds by establishing a law library in
seven of the state's major institutions, with smaller, less equipped li-
braries in twenty other major institutions."' The district court found
that this plan was constitutionally insufficient for meaningful access
purposes and required attorney assistance for the inmates. 2
Several demographic factors present in the Florida inmate popula-
tion appeared to affect significantly the district court's decision. First,
the court observed that the plaintiff, Hooks, was an intelligent and ca-
pable pro se litigant. Based on his earlier pleadings, however, the dis-
trict court found that Hooks was unable to pursue a legal action in
federal court effectively despite his obvious intelligence. 48 Next, and
more importantly, the court considered the literacy rate of the Florida
prison population. The evidence in the case showed that more than fifty
percent of Florida's inmates were functionally illiterate and that a sub-
stantial portion were borderline retarded.4 The court concluded that
law libraries were essentially useless because the inmates would not be
able to comprehend and use effectively the materials in the libraries.
4
Finally, the court noted that ninety-five percent of Florida's inmates
were unable to afford counsel.46 Therefore, attorney assistance was re-
quired to ensure effective access to the courts for all prisoners. 7
In its conclusion that the State's plan did not meet the standards
of Bounds, the court acknowledged other courts' holdings that law li-
braries alone are sufficient to protect the prisoner's right of access.'8
Nevertheless, the Hooks court held that meaningful access to the courts
could be realized only through some form of assistance from an attor-
has executed 21 prisoners, which ranks second behind the 33 executions in Texas. DEATH Row,
U.SA., supra note 12.
39. Hooks I, 536 F. Supp. at 1341.
40. See Potuto, supra note 25, at 227 (discussing whether Bounds requires alternatively law
libraries or legal assistance).
41. Hooks I, 536 F. Supp. at 1335.
42. See id. at 1341.
43. See id. at 1333. The Supreme Court in Bounds, however, stated that "pro se petitioners
are capable of using lawbooks to file cases raising claims that are serious and legitimate even if
ultimately unsuccessful." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 826-27 (1977).
44. Hooks I, 536 F. Supp. at 1337-38.
45. See id. at 1341. See generally Flores, supra note 20, at 274.
46. See Hooks I, 536 F. Supp. at 1338.
47. See Note, supra note 10, at 1281.
48. See Hooks I, 536 F. Supp. at 1340.
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ney. The holding was based primarily on the high illiteracy rate among
the inmates.49 The court focused on the Bounds requirement that ac-
cess must be meaningful as the main concern in determining whether
the right was properly fulfilled. Thus, although Bounds clearly stated
that either an adequate law library or assistance from persons trained
in the law may satisfy the right to access, neither of these remedies was
sufficient for the Hooks court if meaningful access was not attained. 0
The court's extension of Bounds to include mandatory attorney as-
sistance, however, apparently did not require appointed counsel to re-
present individual prisoners throughout the course of postconviction
proceedings. Following the district court's order and prior to the State's
appeal, a death row inmate, Timothy Charles Palmes, petitioned the
court for a stay of execution. Palmes contended that under the district
court's ruling in Hooks the State of Florida had to provide him with
individual appointed counsel for state and federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings.51 The court dismissed Palmes's petition on jurisdictional
grounds, but clearly was displeased with his request for a state ap-
pointed attorney when he was represented by two other attorneys in the
petition before the court.52 The court also noted, however, that while
the previous order did not hold that prisoners are entitled to individu-
alized appointment of counsel, the earlier ruling would be relevant to
such a claim .5 Thus, even under the Hooks court's expanded reading of
Bounds, an indigent death row inmate did not have a clear right to
appointed postconviction representation.
The State of Florida appealed the district court's order requiring
the State to implement an attorney assistance plan, and the Eleventh
Circuit reversed.54 The court held that under Bounds, a state plan need
not include an attorney assistance provision to fulfill the prisoner's
right of meaningful access. 5 The Eleventh Circuit focused on the
Bounds Court's holding that meaningful access requires states to pro-
vide "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law." '  Furthermore, the court felt that the district
49. See id. at 1341. The court did not describe any particular form of assistance or plan, but
simply ordered that the plan must provide for some form of assistance of counsel. See id. at 1355;
see also supra note 26.
50. See Hooks I, 536 F. Supp. at 1349; see also Hinckley, supra note 17, at 49 (stating that
the alternative access approach of Bounds is fatally flawed).
51. See Hooks v. Wainwright, 540 F. Supp. 652 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (Hooks II). For a more
thorough examination of the Palnes litigation, see Mello, supra note 12, at 589-93. Palmes subse-
quently was executed on November 8, 1984. DEATH Row, U.SA., supra note 12.
52. See Hooks II, 540 F. Supp. at 654 n.1; see also Mello, supra note 12, at 591.
53. See Hooks II, 540 F. Supp. at 656.
54. Hooks I, 775 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 913 (1986).
55. See id. at 1434-35.
56. Id. at 1434 (emphasis in original) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)).
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court's order directly contradicted Bounds and that meaningful access
did not require anything beyond the Bounds holding.57
Although Florida's inmate population is largely illiterate, the Elev-
enth Circuit held that mandatory provision of legal services resulted
from an excessively broad reading of the words "meaningful access. '
Bounds recommended that states provide attorneys, but did not equate
this recommendation with a constitutional mandate.5 9 The court relied
heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Ross v. Moffitt" and made a
strong distinction between state programs that are wise and desirable
and those that are constitutionally required.6 1 Indeed, the court stated
that providing assistance for inmates is clearly a good idea and cited
Florida's Capital Collateral Representative Office as an example.6 2 Nev-
ertheless, the court concluded that state provision of attorney assis-
tance for inmates is not constitutionally required to ensure meaningful
access.
6 3
2. Gibson v. Jackson
6
4
Hooks illustrates the potential tension among courts interpreting
the scope of the right of access under Bounds. A similar situation re-
garding a death row inmate arose in Gibson v. Jackson. Samuel Gibson,
an indigent black male, was convicted of murder and rape and sen-
tenced to death. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. 5
Thus, Gibson's traditional right to appointed counsel was exhausted. A
volunteer lawyer then filed a state habeas corpus petition for Gibson,
which claimed that the state court was required to appoint counsel to
represent Gibson in postconviction proceedings and that the State of
Georgia was required to provide the defendant with funds for investiga-
57. See id. at 1435; see also Cepulonis v. Fair, 732 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984) (vacating the portion
of the district court order requiring at least five hours a week of assistance to inmates by law
students under a lawyer's supervision); Harrington v. Holshouser, 741 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1984) (stat-
ing that attorney assistance is one way of assuring access, but is not required); Potuto, supra note
25, at 227.
58. See Hooks I, 775 F.2d at 1435.
59. Id. at 1437.
60. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
61. See Hooks I, 775 F.2d at 1438.
62. See id. The Florida legislature created Florida's Capital Collateral Representative Office
in response to the growing need for representation of indigent death row defendants. The Office is
designed to provide state financed attorneys to death row inmates for collateral attacks on convic-
tions. Mello, supra note 12, at 600. Thirteen of the thirty-seven states with capital punishment
statutes have similar resource centers. Giarratano v. Murray, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2781-82 & n.27
(1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. See Hooks I, 775 F.2d at 1438.
64. 443 F. Supp. 239 (M.D. Ga. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 578 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1119 (1979).
65. Gibson v. State, 236 Ga. 874, 226 S.E.2d 63 (1976).
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tory expenses in the state habeas proceeding.0 6 The state habeas pro-
ceeding was stayed while Gibson filed a section 1983 action in federal
court seeking a declaratory judgment that the state was required to ap-
point counsel and provide monetary assistance as a matter of constitu-
tional right.6 7 The district court held that Gibson was constitutionally
entitled to counsel appointed and paid for by the state for the state
habeas proceeding and to payment by the state for investigative ex-
penses reasonably necessary for his case to be heard fully and fairly. 8
Like the district court in Hooks, the Gibson court primarily relied
on an expanded interpretation of a prisoner's constitutional right of ac-
cess to the courts established by Bounds. The Gibson court first looked
to the language in Bounds that requires a reviewing court to evaluate a
meaningful access plan as a whole to determine if it is constitutionally
adequate.6 9 The court then stated that the broad constitutional stan-
dards of Bounds constitute a minimum level of protection for a prisoner
in any postappeal civil action.7 0 Furthermore, the State of Georgia had
submitted a plan providing all prisoners with access to an adequate law
library.7 1 Therefore, the question before the court was whether the Con-
stitution mandates more than access to an adequate law library.
The court based its holding that Gibson was entitled to appointed
counsel and fees for his state habeas action on two major considera-
tions. Surprisingly, the court first quoted from Justice Rehnquist's dis-
sent in Bounds concerning the extension of meaningful access to
include appointed lawyers.72 Next, the court noted the extreme com-
plexity of a state habeas action and Gibson's probable inability to bring
an effective habeas action without counsel.7 Consequently, the court
66. Gibson, 578 F.2d at 1046-47.
67. Id. at 1047.
68. Gibson, 443 F. Supp. at 250.
69. See id. at 249. The language in Bounds states that "any plan, however, must be evaluated
as a whole to ascertain its compliance with constitutional standards." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 832 (1977) (footnote omitted).
70. See Gibson, 443 F. Supp. at 250.
71. Id.
72. See id.; see also supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text. Justice Rehnquist, however,
was not advocating the appointment of counsel under the right of access. Rather, he believed that
appointment of counsel might be a natural result of the right of access formulated by the majority
in Bounds, which he considered constitutionally baseless. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 841 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
73. The court concluded that Gibson had raised five issues in his habeas petition that could
not be litigated effectively or fairly without the appointment of an attorney and investigative
funds: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; (2) i"-onstit "rnnally composed
grand jury and petit jury lists; (3) deceased victim at time of rape; (4) due process claim based on
extraordinary length of trial; and (5) requirement that petitioner's admissions must be believed in
their entirety under Georgia law. See Gibson, 578 F.2d at 1047 n.2 (summarizing the district
court's findings); supra note 43.
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held that counsel appointed at the state's expense and state payment of
investigative and other litigation expenses were necessary to fulfill Gib-
son's right of meaningful access. Thus, the Gibson court extended
Bounds even further than the Hooks court, which attempted to estab-
lish only an absolute right to attorney assistance rather than a right to
appointed counsel and expense fees. 5
Like the Eleventh Circuit in Hooks, however, the appellate court
refused to allow an expansion of the right of access. The Fifth Circuit
vacated the judgment and held that the district court should have ab-
stained from ruling on the issue of the scope of the right of access be-
cause the state supreme court had not yet addressed the issue.76 Cases
such as Hooks and Gibson reveal the difficulty courts have faced when
attempting to define the scope of the right of meaningful access. Al-
though the necessary elements of the right are far from clear, the pre-
ceding cases tend to show that a right to appointed counsel for habeas
corpus actions initially was not included in the right of meaningful
access.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Pennsylvania v. Finley
77
Precisely the assistance to which an inmate was entitled following a
conviction and appeal remained unclear after the Court's decision in
Bounds. States had little guidance when formulating a constitutionally
adequate meaningful access plan. Ten years after the Bounds decision,
some of Justice Rehnquist's concerns in Bounds reappeared in Pennsyl-
vania v. Finley.
The primary issue in Finley was whether the procedures of Anders
v. California78 for a court appointed attorney on direct appeal would
apply to postconviction collateral representation when the attorney can
find no grounds for seeking relief.79 Finley was appointed counsel for
74. See Gibson, 443 F. Supp. at 250. The court also stated that not every prisoner who brings
a habeas petition is entitled to counsel and litigation expenses. Rather, the court awarded Gibson
relief because of his "demonstrated need." Id. This reasoning provides very little guidance for the
State in attempting to formulate a meaningful access plan and only adds to the confusion sur-
rounding whether such a plan is adequate.
75. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
76. Gibson v. Jackson, 578 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1119 (1979).
77. 481 U.S. 551 (1987). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in Finley.
78. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
79. Finley, 481 U.S. at 554. The Anders case established procedures for a court appointed
attorney who can find no basis for a meritorious direct appeal. Counsel must advise the court and
request permission to withdraw. This request must be accompanied by a brief describing anything
in the record that plausibly might support the appeal. The indigent is supplied with a copy of the
brief and is given time to raise potential claims. The court then decides whether the case is frivo-
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her postconviction claims as required by Pennsylvania law.80 Finley's
counsel concluded that no meritorious claims for relief were available,
advised the trial court of this conclusion, and withdrew."1 Finley ob-
tained new counsel and appealed, challenging the conduct of counsel in
the trial court. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the An-
ders procedures were applicable to an attorney's conduct in collateral
postconviction proceedings.82 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed and held that the Pennsylvania court improperly relied on the
Constitution to extend the Anders requirements to postconviction
procedures."
First, the Finley Court noted that the holding in Anders was based
on the constitutional right to appointed counsel on direct appeal estab-
lished in Douglas v. California.8 4 Thus, Anders created procedures that
are applicable only when a previously established constitutional right to
counsel exists.8 5 Next, the Court stated that no court had ever held that
prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collat-
eral attacks on convictions.8 6
Furthermore, the Court found that the due process and equal pro-
tection concerns that the Ross8 7 Court rejected as a basis for a right to
counsel in discretionary appeals also were unpersuasive in the context
of other forms of postconviction review. Because the right to appointed
counsel does not extend beyond the first appeal of right under Ross, the
Finley Court held that a defendant has no right to counsel when at-
tacking a final conviction in postconviction proceedings. 8 Equal protec-
tion concerns do not require the appointment of counsel for an indigent
defendant simply because a more affluent inmate might be able to re-
tain counsel.8 9
Because Finley's right to counsel was state created, not constitu-
tionally required, the Court held that the Anders procedures were inap-
plicable. Counsel in this postconviction proceeding need only meet the
lous. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. This reasoning also assumes that the defendant has the necessary
skill and intellect to raise such claims.
80. Finley, 481 U.S. at 551.
81. Id.
82. Commonwealth v. Finley, 330 Pa. Super. 313, 479 A.2d 568 (1984).
83. Finley, 481 U.S. at 554.
84. 372 U.S. 353 (1963); see Finley, 481 U.S. at 554.
85. Finley, 481 U.S. at 555.
86. See id. The Court stated that "[o]ur cases establish that the right to appointed counsel
extends to the first appeal of right, and no further. Thus, we have rejected suggestions that we
establish a right to counsel on discretionary appeals." Id. (citations omitted).
87. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
88. See Finley, 481 U.S. at 555.
89. Id. at 556.
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fundamental fairness requirement of the due process clause.90 Finally,
in language especially relevant to the representation of indigents on
death row, the Court noted that states have no obligation to provide an
avenue of postconviction relief and when they do provide such relief,
fundamental fairness does not require the state to supply a lawyer as
well.91
Therefore, while the issue of an indigent death row defendant's
right to postconviction counsel was not directly before the Court in Fin-
ley, the case clearly revealed the Court's reluctance to hold that a right
to counsel in postconviction proceedings constitutionally is required.
This holding is consistent with the holdings of other cases such as
Hooks and Gibson, which refused to require states to implement attor-
ney assistance or appointment systems to ensure meaningful access. Al-
though Finley was not a capital defendant, the Court in Giarratano
relied on the Finley holding to determine whether an indigent death
row defendant constitutionally is entitled to state appointed counsel
following conviction and appeal.
B. Giarratano v. Murray92
Although some courts have addressed the issue of whether a lawyer
must be provided to an indigent death row defendant in postconviction
proceedings in order to ensure meaningful access, none had required a
state to implement a system to appoint individual lawyers to indigent
death row defendants at the postconviction stage until the recent case
of Giarratano v. Murray. The inconsistent holdings in Giarratano
clearly illustrate the judicial tension over whether a state constitution-
ally is required to appoint counsel to represent indigent death row in-
mates in postconviction actions. Giarratano further illustrates the
chaotic judicial process that inevitably accompanies the review of a cap-
ital punishment conviction.
1. Ten Years of Appeals
On February 4, 1979, fifteen-year-old Michelle Kline and her
mother, Barbara Ann Kline, were murdered in their Norfolk, Virginia
apartment. Michelle Kline was raped before the murders.93 Joseph M.
Giarratano, age twenty-one, was arrested two days later and confessed
90. Id. at 556-57.
91. See id. at 557.
92. 668 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1986), rev'd, 836 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th
Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (plurality decision).
93. Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1066, 266 S.E.2d 94, 95 (1980).
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to the rape and murders. Giarratano was appointed counsel94 and con-
victed of rape, murder in the first degree, and capital murder.9 The
trial court sentenced Giarratano to death for the capital murder of
Michelle Kline. 8 On April 18, 1980, fourteen months after the crime,
the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the capital murder conviction.9 7
Today, after ten years of appeals, Joseph M. Giarratano remains on
Virginia's death row.
Following his conviction, Giarratano brought an action in federal
district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the Com-
monwealth of Virginia's refusal to provide postconviction assistance of
counsel to death row inmates. 8 The court permitted other Virginia
death row inmates to intervene and certified a class action. The class
consisted of all present and future death row inmates who could not
afford to retain an attorney for postconviction assistance.9 9 The inmates
primarily contended that Virginia constitutionally was required to pro-
vide counsel to indigent death row defendants in postconviction pro-
ceedings such as writs of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court
or habeas corpus proceedings in state and federal court.10
The district court first stated that the Bounds assumption that ei-
ther trained legal assistance or adequate law libraries would suffice to
provide meaningful access was invalid when applied to death row in-
mates.10 1 The court reasoned that because of the limited amount of
time available to prepare habeas petitions, the complexity of the legal
work, and the emotional instability of the inmates, a law library could
not satisfy Virginia's obligation under the right of meaningful access to
assist death row inmates in preparing and filing useful legal papers.10 2
The court analyzed the two forms of attorney assistance provided
by Virginia. At the time, Virginia provided assistance to death row in-
mates involved in postconviction proceedings in the form of attorneys
appointed to each penal institution to assist in matters related to incar-
ceration.'0 3 Although the Fourth Circuit previously had held that Vir-
94. Id. at 1069, 266 S.E.2d at 97.
95. Id. at 1064, 266 S.E.2d at 94.
96. Id. Giarratano also was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Barbara Ann
Kline and to 30 years imprisonment for the rape of Michelle Kline. Id. at 1066, 266 S.E. 2d at 95.
97. Id. at 1064, 266 S.E.2d at 94.
98. See Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 511. Giarratano brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1982).
99. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 512.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 513.
102. See id.; see also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
103. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 514. This assistance was provided pursuant to VA. CODE
ANN. § 53.1-40 (1978). The distinction between attorney assistance and a right to counsel is impor-
tant. An institutional attorney system such as the one in Giarratano provides attorney assistance
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ginia's institutional attorney system satisfied the Bounds standard of
meaningful access, 0 the district court held that this system provided
inadequate assistance for death row prisoners. 0 5 The court noted that
Virginia had only seven institutional attorneys to meet the needs of
over two thousand prisoners.108 The court also found that if the state
appointed additional attorneys to assist death row inmates, the Bounds
duty still would remain unfulfilled because of the limited scope of the
assistance.07 The court concluded that an attorney must "investigate,
research, and present claimed violations of fundamental rights" to ful-
fill the meaningful access requirement.'
Virginia's second form of attorney assistance provided appointed
counsel to inmates who met certain residency and indigency require-
ments. An inmate could obtain this assistance only after filing a peti-
tion and raising a nonfrivolous claim.109 The court held that this form
of assistance also was inadequate under Bounds because of the timing
of the appointment of counsel. Because an inmate already must have
filed a petition, no attorney assistance was available at the critical stage
of the prisoner's claims. 1" 0
Finally, the court stated that the importance of a death row in-
mate's habeas corpus petition and the scarcity of competent and willing
counsel to assist indigent death row inmates demanded that relief be
granted.", When shaping the required scope of state appointed assis-
tance, the court first held that assistance is not required for the filing of
petitions for writs of certiorari under Ross v. Moffitt."' Next, the court
held that state appointed counsel is required only for state habeas
corpus proceedings and not for federal habeas actions. Thus, Virginia
was required to develop a program to provide appointed counsel on re-
quest to indigent death row inmates for the purpose of pursuing state
habeas corpus relief."3
Both parties appealed the district court's decision.1 4 The Fourth
to inmates who desire to draw postconviction pleadings. The right to counsel provides individual
appointment and representation throughout the proceeding. See supra note 8.
104. See Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that Virginia's institu-
tional attorney system provided meaningful access for prisoners who were not on death row).




109. Id. at 514-15. This assistance was pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-183 (1978).
110. See Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 515.
111. See id.
112. 417 U.S. 600 (1974); see Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 516.
113. See Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 517.
114. Virginia appealed the district court's order requiring a new system of attorney assis-
tance, and the inmate class appealed the court's refusal to order appointment of counsel in federal
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Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding that Virginia
had not met its duty under Bounds and found that a higher standard of
access is not required for death row inmates.115 The court succinctly
and forcefully summarized its holding by stating that the district court
incorrectly had extended Bounds to create a right to counsel that the
Constitution did not require. 16
The Fourth Circuit relied heavily on Finley, which was decided af-
ter the district court's ruling. The court's decision centered on the pre-
mise that no constitutional right to counsel in postconviction
proceedings exists. The court refused to distinguish Finley on the
grounds that the death penalty was not involved in that decision. The
court acknowledged a "significant constitutional difference" between
the death penalty and other forms of punishment;117 the court inter-
preted this difference, however, to mandate the establishment of proce-
dures to ensure a fair imposition of the death penalty at trial. 18
Therefore, a death penalty exception to Finley was inappropriate be-
cause Finley and Giarratano involved requests for posttrial appoint-
ment of counsel.
The Fourth Circuit refused to adopt the district court's reasoning
for its exception to Bounds and held that the district court's three un-
derlying premises were unfounded.119 Finally, the court noted the dif-
ference between personal notions of fairness and constitutional
requirements. 20 Thus, while Virginia's adoption of a more comprehen-
sive system for dealing with postconviction capital cases may have been
a step forward, the court felt that it lacked authority to order such a
habeas petitions. See Giarratano, 836 F.2d at 1421.
115. See id. at 1423.
116. The court stated: "In essence, by reading the record to support a sweeping extension of
Bounds, the district court has, under the guise of meaningful access, established a right of counsel
where none is required by the Constitution." Id.
117. Id. at 1424; see Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (holding that the death penalty is
constitutionally different).
118. See Giarratano, 836 F.2d at 1425.
119. See id. at 1426; see also supra note 102 and accompanying text. The court stated that
inmates were capable of initiating postconviction proceedings; Giarratano himself had done so sev-
eral times in the last seven years. Furthermore, the complexity of death penalty cases was not
excessive, and the purpose of the right to counsel was not to provide the inmate with a private
investigator. Finally, time constraints were not present, but rather, a substantial period of time
was allowed to file petitions in death penalty cases. See Giarratano, 836 F.2d at 1426; cf. Marshall,
Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1986). Justice Thurgood Marshall characterized the capital punishment review process
as a "Rush to Judgment" that gives inmates very little time to prepare petitions. Capital defend-
ants usually have no counsel until the situation becomes urgent. See id. at 5. Justice Marshall
further noted that indigents on death row did not appear to have a constitutional right to counsel
for discretionary postconviction appeals in light of the Court's earlier decisions. See id.
120. See Giarratano, 836 F.2d at 1427.
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change under the Constitution.'21
The Fourth Circuit subsequently reconsidered the case en banc, re-
versed the panel's decision, and affirmed the district court's decision.'22
First, the court held that the state could not rely on Finley for the
proposition that prisoners are not entitled constitutionally to state sup-
plied attorneys in postconviction proceedings.123 The court refused to
apply Finley because Finley did not address the meaningful access rule
of Bounds directly. Furthermore, the fact that Finley did not involve
the death penalty was extremely significant to the court.1 4 According to
the Giarratano en banc court, a prisoner is entitled to appointed coun-
sel in state habeas proceedings because of society's compelling interest
in ensuring that the death penalty is administered constitutionally and
because of the belief that the death penalty is constitutionally differ-
ent.125 Therefore, the court refused to hold that Finley suggested that
counsel is not required in postconviction proceedings in death penalty
cases.
The court also refused, however, to extend the right to counsel to
federal habeas actions and Supreme Court certiorari petitions.126 Rely-
ing on Ross, 27 the court stated that a federal court considering a
habeas petition would have briefs, transcripts, and opinions available
from the lower proceedings.'28 Furthermore, the indigent death row in-
mate would have these same materials available if a state appointed
attorney was provided for the state habeas action. 29 Thus, the court
concluded that meaningful access requires only appointment of counsel
at the state level of postconviction proceedings in death penalty
cases. 30
2. The Supreme Court's Holding
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit
and held that in capital cases, as in noncapital cases, no constitutional
right to postconviction representation exists.' 3' The Court began its
121. Id.
122. See Giarratano, 847 F.2d at 1118.
123. See id. at 1121.
124. See id. at 1122.
125. See id. The court further stated that "[b]ecause of the peculiar nature of the death
penalty, we find it difficult to envision any situation in which appointed counsel would not be
required in state post-conviction proceedings when a prisoner under the sentence of death could
not afford an attorney." Id. at 1122 n.8.
126. See id. at 1122.
127. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U,S. 600 (1974).
128. See Giarratano, 847 F.2d at 1122.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. at 2765.
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analysis by noting that, in some instances, the Constitution requires
special procedures for a capital punishment case. 3 2 The Court distin-
guished these procedures, however, on the ground that they all occur at
the trial stage of a capital offense case, rather than during a postconvic-
tion action.133 The Court held, therefore, that the rule of Finley applies
equally in capital and noncapital cases, even though Finley was not a
death penalty case.13 4 A plurality of the Court stated that additional
safeguards imposed at the trial level of a capital case are sufficient to
ensure the reliability of the death penalty."3 5 The Court refused to use
the eighth amendment or the due process clause to create yet another
distinction between capital and noncapital cases.'36
The Court also noted that direct appeal is the primary avenue for
review of both capital convictions and other sentences. Therefore, pub-
lic policy considerations of conserving scarce resources require Virginia
to use its resources for the appointment of attorneys at the trial and
appellate stages of a capital case, which would reduce the number of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are brought in collateral
attacks.
13 7
The plurality also held that the holdings in Bounds and Finley are
not inconsistent and that neither case is determinative of the issue
presented in Giarratano.13 8 The plurality held, however, that the rea-
soning of Finley would apply to death row inmates as well as other in-
mates and that Finley, therefore, limits the reach of the Bounds right
of access.'3 9
132. See id. at 2769 (plurality opinion) (citing Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (holding
that the trial judge must give the jury the option to convict the defendant of a lesser offense); and
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that the jury must be allowed to consider all of a
capital defendant's mitigating evidence)).
133. See id. at 2770.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 2770-71. This statement ignores the startlingly high success rate of federal
habeas petitions in death penalty cases. See infra note 154.
136. See Giarratano, 109 S.Ct. at 2771.
137. Id. (stating that "[c]apable lawyering [at trial and direct appeal] would mean fewer col-
orable claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to be litigated on collateral attack").
138. See id. at 2772.
139. See id. The Court also noted that under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, attorneys will
be appointed in federal habeas corpus actions that raise a challenge to a death penalty sentence for
drug-related convictions. See id. at 2772 n.7; see also The Drug Bill's Secret Provision, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 20, 1989, at 3. The pertinent provisions of the Act state:
(B) In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of title 28, United
States Code, seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, any defendant who is or becomes
financially unable to obtain adequate representation or investigative, expert, or other reasona-
bly necessary services shall be entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys and the
furnishing of such other services in accordance with paragraphs (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9).
(5) If the appointment is made before judgment, at least one attorney so appointed must
have been admitted to practice in the court in which the prosecution is to be tried for not less
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Bounds Dissent Revisited
The Court's decision in Giarratano is not surprising in light of pre-
vious decisions addressing the right of access and the right to counsel.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Bounds foreshadowed the plurality's de-
cision in Giarratano.140 Because of the lack of a sufficient constitutional
basis for a right to appointed counsel in postconviction proceedings, the
Giarratano plurality followed the reasoning of the Bounds dissent re-
flecting a belief that no constitutional basis for a right to counsel fol-
lowing the first appeal of right exists in any case.
Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated in his dissent in Bounds that a
logical extension of the right of access articulated by the Bounds major-
ity would lead to the conclusion that a right to counsel would exist dur-
than five years, and must have had not less than three years experience in the actual trial of
felony prosecutions in that court.
(6) If the appointment is made after judgment, at least one attorney so appointed must
have been admitted to practice in the court of appeals for not less than five years, and must
have had not less than three years experience in the handling of appeals in that court in
felony cases.
(7) With respect to paragraphs (5) and (6), the court, for good cause, may appoint an-
other attorney whose background, knowledge, or experience would otherwise enable him or
her to properly represent the defendant, with due consideration to the seriousness of the
possible penalty and to the unique and complex nature of the litigation.
(8) Unless replaced by similarly qualified counsel upon the attorney's own motion or
upon motion of the defendant, each attorney so appointed shall represent the defendant
throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings, including pretrial pro-
ceedings, trial, sentencing, motions for new trial, appeals, applications, for writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States, and all available post-conviction process, together
with applications for stays of execution and other appropriate motions and procedures, and
shall also represent the defendant in such competency proceedings and proceedings for execu-
tive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant.
(9) Upon a finding in ex parte proceedings that investigative, expert or other services are
reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant, whether in connection with is-
sues relating to guilt or sentence, the court shall authorize the defendant's attorneys to obtain
such services on behalf of the defendant and shall order the payment of fees and expenses
therefore, under paragraph (10). Upon a finding that timely procurement of such services
could not practicably await prior authorization, the court may authorize the provision of and
payment for such services nunc pro tunc.
(10) Notwithstanding the rates and maximum limits generally applicable to criminal
cases and any other provision of law to the contrary, the court shall fix the compensation to
be paid to attorneys apppointed under this subsection and the fees and expenses to be paid
for investigative, expert, and other reasonably necessary services authorized under paragraph
(9), at such rates or amounts as the court determines to be reasonably necessary to carry out
the requirements of paragraphs (4) through (9).
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001, 102 Stat. 4181, 4393-94. This Act,
however, is not relevant to the question in Giarratano of whether counsel is required in state
habeas actions.
140. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
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ing the postconviction stage.142 In Giarratano, however, the plurality
clearly restricted the reach of Bounds in an attempt to maintain consis-
tency with Finley and Ross. This restriction is correct despite the prac-
tical difficulties that a lack of postconviction counsel poses in the
administration of the death penalty.143 While the Supreme Court's
holding can be justified under Finley and Ross, the Court's rationale
that "death is different" applies only to procedures used at trial 44 ig-
nores the realities of death penalty litigation. 14
The Fourth Circuit's reasons for requiring appointed counsel in
Giarratano clearly represent a wise policy that states should imple-
ment, but these reasons do not rest on a solid constitutional basis. 4 6
The court correctly acknowledged that the inherent difficulty facing an
indigent death row defendant when preparing postconviction petitions
favors attorney assistance. 47 Although an institutional attorney system
was in place in Virginia, the Fourth Circuit extended Bounds beyond
other right of access cases such as Hooks by requiring individual attor-
ney appointments. 48 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit seemed to ignore
the legal complexity of filing habeas petitions in federal court and gave
few reasons to support its holding that a right to counsel is a necessary
element of meaningful access in state habeas actions, but is not re-
quired for federal habeas petitions. Although the court determined that
Finley does not preclude a right to counsel in state habeas actions, the
court gave no constitutional basis for the existence of the right.149
B. State Legislative Duty
Giarratano effectively leaves the fulfillment of meaningful access
for indigents on death row to state legislatures because the courts can-
not place an affirmative burden on states to provide services that may
142. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 841 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
143. For an example of the immense difficulty that counsel faces when brought into a capital
case at the last minute, see Judge, Death Row Defense, Wall Street Style, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb.
1989, at 35, which details the two-year, $1.7 million appeal that resulted in the reversal of a death
sentence for Mississippi inmate Samuel Bice Johnson.
144. See Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. at 2777 n.9 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Ford v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (Marshall, J., plurality opinion)).
145. A commission chaired by Justice Lewis Powell stated: "Because, as a practical matter,
the focus of review in capital cases often shifts to collateral proceedings, the lack of adequate
counsel creates severe problems." JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., AD Hoc COMM. ON FED.
HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, COMMITTEE REPORT AND PROPOSAL 4 (1989) [hereinafter POWELL
COMMITTEE], reprinted in Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA)
3239, 3240 (Sept. 27, 1989) [hereinafter Report on Habeas Corpus].
146. See Giarratano, 847 F.2d at 1118.
147. See id. at 1122.
148. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
149. See Giarratano, 847 F.2d at 1122.
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be wise but are unsupported on constitutional grounds. The distinction
between what is wise for a state to do and what is constitutionally man-
dated is important. Despite the apparent crisis in indigent defense, 150
especially among death row prisoners, courts are limited in their power
to force a state to provide attorneys. Without a clear judicial definition
of the right to counsel, a state may implement whatever plan it chooses
as long as the plan meets the vague minimum standards of Bounds.51
Some states have made great strides toward fulfilling the need for coun-
sel, but an even greater response is necessary if capital punishment is
ever to be used in a truly reliable and expeditious manner.
V. CONCLUSION
The result reached in Giarratano, although constitutionally cor-
rect, reflects a tremendous weakness in the manner in which capital
punishment currently is imposed. 5 The death penalty presently is ad-
ministered in a grossly ineffective manner and serves none of the pur-
poses of capital punishment. 5 ' The recent increase in cases requiring a
determination of the scope of the right of access for death row prisoners
demonstrates that more definite guidelines are needed to ensure that
inmates receive the full benefit of the procedures available to them.
The right of access is extremely important to death row inmates be-
cause collateral proceedings are a capital defendant's last line of de-
fense against execution. The startlingly high success rate of these
actions reveals that these petitions are crucial to a capital defendant
and cannot be ignored. 54 If the death penalty must be imposed at all, it
should be imposed with the highest degree of accuracy. 55
150. See generally Mello, supra note 12; Reid, supra note 12.
151. Some commentators had indicated prior to the Court's decision in Giarratano that a
reversal of the Fourth Circuit "could have devastating consequences." See Spangenberg & Wilson,
State Post-Conviction Representation of Defendants Sentenced to Death, 72 JUDicATURE 331, 337
(1989). These commentators warned that "[iln the absence of a federal requirement, some state
legislatures might eliminate the costly and time-consuming provision of counsel in state capital
post-conviction matters." Id.
152. As Justice Lewis Powell has stated, "The problems associated with capital punishment
are among the more serious ones in our system of justice.. . . If capital punishment is to serve its
intended purposes, perhaps the time has come for some reexamination of our system of dual collat-
eral review." Powell, supra note 3, at 1035.
153. See id. at 1041 (stating that "[b]oth the retributive and deterrent purposes of capital
punishment are imperiled by the current practice of repetitive review"); see also POWELL COMMIT-
TEE, supra note 145, at 3, reprinted in Report on Habeas Corpus, supra note 145, at 3239 (stating
that "[flew would argue that the current state of death penalty administration is satisfactory").
154. See Mello, supra note 12, at 520-21 (estimating that the success rate from 1976-1986 in
federal capital habeas proceedings is between 60-70%).
155. Some commentators have argued that due to the popularity of the death penalty, states
will not repeal death penalty statutes even if the statutes appear unworkable. These states may
adopt alternative methods of punishment to avoid the high political costs of abolishing the death
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The problem with postconviction review in capital cases only will
worsen in the future. Studies show that an even greater number of capi-
tal cases soon will be entering the postconviction review stage.156 More
than fifty percent of all death row inmates still are awaiting the out-
come of their first appeal, and more than two hundred and fifty inmates
join death row each year. 57
The ever worsening delay in capital cases will continue unless the
states take the initiative to provide counsel to a defendant at all stages
of trial and review in a capital case. A capital defendant needs compe-
tent counsel at the postconviction stage more than a noncapital defend-
ant. Until the states provide competent counsel for postconviction
attacks on capital sentences, the federal court system will continue to
be plagued by repetitive petitions for postconviction relief.
William H. Brooks
penalty. See, e.g., Note, Life Without Parole: An Alternative to Death or Not Much of a Life at
All?, 43 VAND. L. REv. 529 (1990).
156. Spangenberg & Wilson, supra note 151, at 332.
157. As of June 1988, only 934 of more than 2100 death row inmates in the United States
had completed the first appellate review of their convictions. Id.
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